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ABSTRACT 
How should courts compare works in different media when 
determining whether one infringes the other? A plaintiff in a 
copyright infringement action must establish that the defendant’s 
work is “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s work. In order to 
determine whether two works are substantially similar, courts 
typically evaluate the elements of the works that constitute “protected 
expression,” which differ depending on the work’s medium (e.g., 
literary, film, visual artwork, photography, music, etc.). Courts and 
commentators generally agree that the differences in media are not 
relevant to whether two works are substantially similar, but have not 
explained how to compare expressive elements of works in different 
media. 
In this Article, drawing on the nature of the statutory derivative 
work right as clarified by the theoretical research and related case 
law, I argue that courts should translate the expressive elements of the 
plaintiff’s original work into equivalent modes of expression in the 
new medium to create a hypothetical “faithful adaptation.” The 
faithful adaptation would then serve as the benchmark for comparison 
to the defendant’s work. The author’s right to create transformations 
(or derivatives) of the original work must serve as the basis for 
comparison because it is the right that has allegedly been infringed. 
Thus, applying the “faithful adaptation” standard will transform the 
plaintiff’s “orange” into an “apple” to allow for an “apples-to-apples” 
comparison of the two works. Accordingly, adopting the faithful 
adaptation standard will allow courts to apply the existing variations 
of the substantial similarity test to works in different media without 
being derailed by irrelevant dissimilarities inherent to different media. 
INTRODUCTION 
o prevail in a copyright infringement action, a plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant’s work is “substantially similar” to the 
plaintiff’s work. When evaluating literary works, for example, 
assessing substantial similarity requires a comparison of the 
“articulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, 
T
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setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events in the two works.”1 
However, this comparison becomes problematic when a defendant 
infringes a work by translating it into a different medium.2 The 
Copyright Act’s derivative work right unquestionably protects an 
author’s right to translate a work into a different medium.3 But, 
comparing works in different media raises several issues. For 
example, how does one compare the pacing of a book to the pacing of 
a film?4 The differences between the two works may be attributable to 
the difference in medium rather than a lack of substantial similarity.5 
Most courts and commentators have recognized that differences 
dictated by a choice of medium are not relevant to an analysis of 
substantial similarity.6 Yet, they have not explained how to apply the 
existing test when analyzing works in different media. 
In this Article, I argue that the correct manner of analyzing the 
substantial similarity of works in different media is to translate the 
plaintiff’s work into the same medium as the allegedly infringing 
work. After all, the derivative work right encompasses the right to 
create that transformation. Consequently, that transformation should 
serve as the relevant benchmark. Thus, courts should be guided by 
what a “faithful adaptation” of the plaintiff’s work would look like in 
the infringing work’s medium. The faithful adaptation can then be 
 
1 Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 
F.3d 262, 273 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen evaluating claims of infringement involving 
literary works, we have noted that . . . our examination would encompass ‘the similarities 
in such aspects as the total concept and feel, theme, characters, plot, sequence, pace, and 
setting of the plaintiff’s books and the defendants’ works.’” (alteration marks omitted)). 
2 See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s 
Derivative Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505, 1520 (2013) (“Dramatizations and motion-
picture versions transform expressive elements of the plot, structure, characters, narrative 
thread, and the like of the underlying work to a different medium. Often, numerous 
changes are necessitated by the change in medium.”). 
3 Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 210 (1983). 
4  Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting the 
difficultly of “compar[ing] ‘mood and pace’ between works which are captured in 
different media (written word versus film)”), aff’d, 90 F. App’x 496 (9th Cir. 2003). 
5 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage 
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1985) (“Application of the ‘substantial similarity’ 
test . . . is extremely problematic, particularly in the context of adaptations. . . . The use of 
this test with respect to derivative and preexisting works requires caution . . . because the 
technical requirements of a different medium usually necessitate certain changes, which 
could lull an ordinary observer into believing that no substantial similarity exists.”). 
6 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 477–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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compared to the allegedly infringing work using the traditional 
substantial similarity analysis for the second medium. The faithful 
adaptation standard will therefore allow courts to correctly filter out 
differences solely attributable to choice of medium and apply the 
accepted test for substantial similarity within the second medium. 
Although cases involving films that allegedly infringe books may 
provide the most typical example, the standard would apply in any 
infringement action involving an infringing work in a different 
medium than the plaintiff’s original work. 
In order to ensure that plaintiffs are not permitted to use the 
standard to expand the derivative work right beyond its intended 
scope, however, the theoretical research suggests that infringement 
claims involving works in different media must be limited to those 
implicating derivative markets that the plaintiff could have reasonably 
contemplated exploiting at some point during the creative process.7 
This limitation provides sufficient protection for authors’ rights to 
exploit derivative markets to the extent that those markets would have 
provided some incentive for creating the work in the first instance.8 
The faithful adaptation test thus proceeds in two steps. First, it asks 
whether there was a foreseeable market for the adaptation of the work 
in the new medium. To the extent that there is no foreseeable market, 
then no faithful adaptation exists. Second, it asks whether there is 
substantial similarity between the two works after translating the 
plaintiff’s work into the second medium using that medium’s 
equivalent means of expression. Substantial similarity is evaluated 
with reference to the second medium’s expressive elements. In 
applying both aspects of the faithful adaptation test, courts may find 
expert analysis particularly instructive.9 
Accordingly, the faithful adaptation standard would allow plaintiffs 
to recover in infringement actions only to the extent that the plaintiffs 
would have if they actually had decided to exploit their rights to 
prepare derivative works in new media.10 Thus, authors’ incentives to 
create works that can be exploited in new media will be preserved 
 
7 Cf. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1522–23; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability 
and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1574–75 (2009); Michael 
Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. 
L. REV. 317, 373 (2005); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1215–16 (1996). 
8 Cf. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1527–28; Goldstein, supra note 3, at 221. 
9   See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845, 847–48 (9th Cir. 2004). 
10 See infra Part III. 
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without unnecessarily limiting opportunities for other authors to build 
upon past works in new markets in a way that is consistent with the 
primary rationale for protecting the right to produce derivative 
works.11 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the relevant 
background, including basic copyright principles, the derivative work 
right, and substantial similarity. Part II explains the nature of the 
problem, highlighting the difficulties of applying the current 
substantial similarity framework to infringement claims where the 
works are in different media. Part III then explains how the faithful 
adaptation standard resolves the problem without expanding 
plaintiff’s rights. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
A. Copyright Principles 
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”12 Following this directive, the Second Circuit has 
described the purpose of the Copyright Act as “promot[ing] the 
advancement of knowledge and learning by giving authors economic 
incentives (in the form of exclusive rights to their creations) to labor 
on creative, knowledge-enriching works.”13 Some commentators have 
also suggested that copyright protection is justifiable because authors 
“deserve” compensation for their creative works.14 Thus, copyright 
 
11 See infra Part III.B and notes 84, 239–40. 
12 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
13 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 
1994).  Although Congress’s stated purpose of providing copyright protection is to 
incentivize creativity, Joel Waldfogel’s research on the music industry found scant 
evidence of such an effect. Joel Waldfogel, Bye, Bye, Miss American Pie? The Supply of 
New Recorded Music Since Napster 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 16882, 2011) (“While it is customary to assume that IP protection provides . . . an 
incentive [for creativity], there is actually very little evidence about its effect on music 
supply.”). 
14 E.g., Sterk, supra note 7, at 1227 (“[C]ourts, Congress, and scholars have invoked 
the notion that authors ‘deserve’ the public benefit their creations generate, even if those 
authors would have created the same works without any promise of copyright monopoly. 
Indeed, a number of long-standing copyright doctrines are far more consistent with a 
desert theory of copyright than with any incentive rationale.”). 
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holders are granted a statutory monopoly to exploit their works.15 
Subject to certain defenses and other limitations, the Copyright Act 
gives the copyright owner “the exclusive rights to reproduce, to 
distribute, and to display the copyrighted work, as well as to prepare 
derivative works based on the copyrighted work.”16 
One of the central problems of copyright law is balancing the 
interests of copyright holders and the interests of those who would 
build upon their work.17 As one court put it: “Intellectual property 
rights aren’t free: They’re imposed at the expense of future creators 
and of the public at large.”18 Accordingly, too much protection 
reduces the number of copies of a work available to the public and 
constrains the rights of other authors to build upon those works while 
providing only a limited marginal increase in the incentives to create 
new works.19 “To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their 
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the 
ideas and information conveyed by a work.”20 Copyright protection is 
“limited to those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that 
display the stamp of the author’s originality.”21 The key distinction 
between copyright and patent protection is that copyright protection 
does not protect ideas.22 Indeed, unlike patents, copyrights are not 
 
15 See id. at 1204–05. 
16 Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012)). 
17 Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Only by vigorously policing 
the line between idea and expression can we ensure both that artists receive due reward for 
their original creations and that proper latitude is granted other artists to make use of ideas 
that properly belong to us all.”); Thomas M.S. Hemnes, The Adaptation of Copyright Law 
to Video Games, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 207 (1982) (“[T]he central problem of copyright 
law is to reconcile and balance interests in, on the one hand, rewarding individuals for 
their ‘unique creative efforts,’ and, on the other hand, making authors’ ‘ideas freely 
accessible to the public so that they may be used for the intellectual advancement of 
mankind,’ thus promoting ‘the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (citations omitted)). 
18 Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013). 
19 Sterk, supra note 7, at 1207 (“Although each additional increment in copyright 
protection increases the return to authors and hence induces potential authors to give up 
other enterprises, the number of creative works produced will not be directly proportional 
to the level of copyright protection. We would expect each additional increment of 
protection to induce fewer additional authors to engage in creative work. That is, once 
returns to creative activity have become high relative to returns in other pursuits, more of 
the people who could be induced to engage in creative activity already would have done 
so.”). 
20 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991). 
21 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985). 
22 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(indicating that copyright law does not provide “patent-like” protection for ideas). 
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subject to a rigorous examination of novelty before protection is 
granted.23 The Copyright Act accordingly provides that copyright 
protection does not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied 
in such work.”24 Although the distinction between ideas and 
expression is easily stated, it can be difficult to draw in practice.25 
Copyright protection is also subject to other significant 
limitations.26 Protectable works must display originality, which 
requires independent creation and “a modicum of creativity.”27 
Additionally, certain forms of expression are not protectable.28 These 
include “[f]amiliar stock scenes and themes that are staples of 
literature” as well as “[s]cenes-a-faire, or situations and incidents that 
flow necessarily or naturally from a basic plot premise.”29 Similarly, 
under the “merger” doctrine, “[w]hen the ‘idea’ and its ‘expression’ 
are . . . inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ will not be barred, since 
protecting the ‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a 
monopoly of the ‘idea’ upon the copyright owner free of the 
conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law.”30 The fair use 
defense also provides an important counterweight “to the copyright 
law’s goal of protecting creators’ work product.”31 The defense is 
 
23 Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the 
Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1932 (2007). 
24 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).   
25 Hemnes, supra note 17, at 211 (“For graphic works such as paintings and sculptures 
the [idea versus expression] distinction is especially inept; it is perhaps in recognition of 
this that Congress reversed the Act’s logic for ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,’ 
granting their expression protection only if ‘capable of existing independently of’ the 
‘utilitarian’ aspects of the work. Justice Kaplan has argued persuasively that the 
identification of ‘ideas’ in musical works, particularly modern works lacking in melody, is 
equally futile.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN 
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 53 (1967))). 
26 Sterk, supra note 7, at 1210 (discussing several “long-standing doctrinal limitations 
on copyright protection [that] reflect a concern with the monopoly power that overbroad 
copyright doctrine generates”). 
27 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
28 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002). 
29 Id. 
30 CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1261 (9th Cir. 1999). 
31 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 804–05 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575–77 (1994)) (“Recognizing that 
science and art generally rely on works that came before them and rarely spring forth in a 
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primarily intended to protect the use of works “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching[,] . . . scholarship, or 
research.”32 
Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh has argued that an additional 
limitation is inherent in copyright’s incentive structure: 
foreseeability.33 Professor Balganesh contends that courts should 
“employ a test of foreseeability to determine the point up to which a 
copyright owner should be allowed to internalize the gains from his 
work.”34 Thus, the question “to ask [is] whether the use complained 
of is one that the copyright owner (that is, the plaintiff) could have 
reasonably foreseen at the time that the work was created (that is, the 
point when the entitlement commences).”35 As explained below, 
these considerations are particularly significant when evaluating the 
extent to which the derivative work right protects an author’s right to 
exploit new markets resulting from new technologies.36 
B. Derivative Works 
One of the more controversial rights that the Copyright Act grants 
to copyright owners is the exclusive right “to prepare derivative 
works based upon the copyrighted work.”37 Congress has defined 
derivative works as those “based upon one or more preexisting works, 
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”38 Professor Pamela 
Samuelson has suggested that these statutory examples can be 
clustered into three main categories: shorter versions, faithful 
renditions, and transformations of expression from one medium or 
genre to another.39 Works “consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
 
vacuum, the Act limits the rights of a copyright owner regarding works that build upon, 
reinterpret, and reconceive existing works.”). 
32 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
33   Balganesh, supra note 7, at 1572–75. 
34   Id. at 1574. 
35   Id. at 1575. 
36 See id. at 1572. 
37 17 U.S.C. § 106(2); see also Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 
1983) (noting that a person who has no authority to make a derivative work could not 
copyright such a work). 
38 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
39 Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1518–20. 
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represent an original work of authorship” are also considered 
“derivative works.”40 Thus, “[t]he derivative work right redresses 
misappropriation of indirect or potential markets for the work, as well 
as the usurpation of primary or direct markets, by prohibiting the 
unauthorized use of expressive elements in subsequent works, 
regardless of whether such use involves any ‘copying’ in the ordinary 
sense of the term.”41 
1. Evolution of the Derivative Work Right 
The derivative work right is a relatively recent development. At 
common law, copyright protection was essentially limited to verbatim 
copying with courts finding that even translations and abridgements 
did not infringe copyrights.42 The Copyright Act of 1790 similarly 
provided no protection for derivative works.43 In the 1800s, courts 
initially remained resistant to protection for anything resembling 
derivative works.44 The courts sometimes noted that infringement of 
an adaptation in a new medium was unlikely to have any impact on 
the market for the original work.45 According to Professor Paul 
Goldstein, this understanding reflected the existing “technology of the 
printing press and . . . the assumption that the law’s proper concern 
was with literal copies rendered in the same medium.”46 As 
technology evolved and the variety of mediums expanded, however, 
 
40 17 U.S.C.  § 101. 
41 Lateef Mtima, So Dark the Con(tu) of Man: The Quest for a Software Derivative 
Work Right in Section 117, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 57 (2008). 
42 Hemnes, supra note 17, at 208. 
43 Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 581 
(2006) (“Early American copyright statutes provided copyright owners with very 
rudimentary rights. The first Copyright Act (of 1790) ensured protection of any ‘map, 
chart or book’ for an initial term of 14 years plus a renewal term of 14 years. Moreover, 
the scope of the copyright given to an author was limited to the right to copy the work 
itself and did not include the right to make ‘derivative works’ (such as translations of a 
novel into another language, for example).”). 
44 Kindra Deneau, The Historical Development and Misplaced Justification for the 
Derivative Work Right, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 68, 77 (2013) (“At the start of the 
nineteenth century, courts typically found no infringement in what leading French 
commentary called ‘the transmutation of form that the translator causes the original to 
undergo.’” (alteration marks omitted)). 
45 Id. at 86. 
46 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 210–11. 
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resistance to the protection of non-verbatim transformations began to 
erode.47 
By 1870, Congress was ready to recognize protection for derivative 
works.48 In the 1870 Copyright Act, Congress expanded copyright 
protection to translations and dramatizations.49 Derivative rights were 
expanded again in the 1909 Act, which recognized an author’s ability 
to transform a work into a new medium.50 Authors were provided 
with certain specific rights, including the exclusive right to transform 
their works into novels, nondramatic works, and musical 
arrangements and adaptations.51 One commentator suggests that 
Congress did not intend to provide greater protection to works in 
different media; it only intended to extend the test for copying to “the 
conversion of works across different commercial media.”52 In any 
event, the courts began to recognize nonliteral copying as 
actionable.53 
In 1961, anticipating revisions to the copyright laws, the Register 
of Copyrights noted that the right to make translations, 
dramatizations, and to execute models or designs had been a part of 
the Copyright Act since 1870. As a result, the Register recommended 
that “the right to make new versions should be retained as a separate 
right in the new Copyright Act to ‘avoid any doubt’ about the extent 
of an authors’ copyright protection.”54 In response, bill drafts from 
Congress referenced a “right of ‘making new versions’ of a copyright-
protected work.”55 
 
47 See Hemnes, supra note 17, at 208 (“Nineteenth century decisions in England and in 
the United States preserved the rules that permitted translations and abridgements. 
However, the dike separating actionable verbatim copying from all other forms of taking 
suffered a steady erosion under the influence of expansive copyright legislation, judicial 
elaboration of the concept of ‘substantial’ taking, and scholarly criticism of the early 
limitations on copyright protection.”). 
48 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 214. 
49 Deneau, supra note 44, at 70. 
50 Id. at 80. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 82–83. 
53 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 215 (“Most of the early [derivative rights] cases . . . 
recognized that, for the original work to be given the appropriate level of protection, literal 
changes could not be allowed to avoid infringement. Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co.[, 175 F. 
902 (2d Cir. 1910),] is typical, the court there holding that defendant’s play, ‘The Heir to 
Hoorah,’ infringed plaintiff’s right to dramatize his story, ‘The Transmogrification of 
Dan,’ even though the play borrowed only the story’s central incident and contributed 
events, characters and dialogue of its own.”). 
54 Deneau, supra note 44, at 87. 
55 Id. 
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Instead, however, Congress enacted the current statute, 
representing the culmination of a growing “commitment to derivative 
rights.”56 The resulting 1976 Act expanded the derivative right 
beyond the strict dictates of the 1909 Act.57 Professor Goldstein has 
argued that this expansion of derivative rights reflects the “growth of 
new copyright industries” and the need to detach copyright law from 
the technological confines of the printing press.58 Others have made 
the less welcoming observation that it also represents an expansion of 
the rights of copyright owners and their monopoly power.59 
2. Understanding the Derivative Work Right 
The derivative work right is widely understood as extending 
protection to the transformation of a work into a different medium.60 
In what may be the most common example of the derivative right in 
action, an author of a book has the exclusive right to transform the 
work into a film.61 The right, however, can stretch far beyond that 
 
56 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 210. 
57 Michael Wurzer, Note, Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Prepare Derivative 
Works: Reducing Uncertainty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (1989) (noting that the 1976 
Act extended the right to prepare derivative works from authors of literary works to 
authors of all works). 
58 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 209 (noting, for example, that “[h]ardcover book sales, 
which once represented the principal measure of a novel’s popular success, are today 
dwarfed by the income from motion pictures, television series, sequels and merchandise 
derived from the novel.”). 
59 Bohannan, supra note 43, at 586 (suggesting that protection for derivative works is a 
“product of special-interest influence” that is “difficult to justify on economic grounds”). 
Professor Christina Bohannan has also characterized the derivative work right as “a right 
to prevent others from producing new works that build or improve upon the copyright 
owner’s work.” Id. at 588. 
60 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 209 (“Copyright, which once protected only against the 
production of substantially similar copies in the same medium as the copyrighted work, 
today protects against uses and media that often lie far afield from the original.”); see also 
Bohannan, supra note 43, at 588 (criticizing the statutory framework of the derivative 
work right, but conceding that the reasons for protecting reproductions against copying 
“might justify a narrow derivative works right, or a right that protects against substantially 
copying the original work in a new form or medium”). 
61 Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 326 (“The [derivative work] definition thus leaves 
little doubt that a movie version of a book would be covered, and it is uncontroversial that 
a sequel to a book or movie similarly would count as a transformation or an adaptation.”); 
David E. Shipley & Jeffrey S. Hay, Protecting Research: Copyright, Common-Law 
Alternatives, and Federal Preemption, 63 N.C. L. REV. 125, 130–31 (1984) (“The author 
also has authority over the preparation of works derived from his protected work, such as 
the adaptation of a book or movie.  This right is similar to the reproduction right, and it 
allows an author to control how his work is recast and transformed in a different medium. 
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typical example to the point where the resulting work bears little 
resemblance to the original.62 A derivative work, however, need not 
be in a different medium to warrant protection.63 For example, a 
colorized version of a classic black-and-white film would qualify as a 
derivative work.64 However, the derivative work must still have 
elements of originality distinct from the original work to warrant 
independent protection.65 
As many commentators have observed, there is a substantial degree 
of overlap between the reproduction right and the derivative right.66 
Some have argued that this creates a state of confusion, susceptible to 
 
Thus, a movie studio that adapted a book to a movie without authorization could be liable 
for violating the right to prepare derivative works, as well as the right of reproduction and 
the right to control performances.”). 
62 Shipley & Hay, supra note 61, at 131 n.51 (“Determining whether an adaptation 
infringes another’s copyright is not easy unless it is a very close reproduction. The 
transformations often may be so great that it is difficult to see any connection between the 
works.”); Goldstein, supra note 3, at 217 (“The continuum may stretch from an underlying 
novel or story to the work’s adaptation into a motion picture, its transformation into a 
television series, and the eventual embodiment of its characters in dolls, games and other 
merchandise. The works at the outer reaches of this continuum, and some intermediate 
works as well, will frequently bear scant resemblance to the expression or the ideas of the 
seminal work and will often be connected only by a license authorizing use of a title or 
character name.”). 
63 See, e.g., infra note 64. 
64 Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 375 (“Colorized versions of movies generally are 
considered to be derivative works . . . .”). 
65 Shipley & Hay, supra note 61, at 130 n.44 (“Only those elements that are original to 
the derivative work—materials contributed by the work’s author—are entitled to 
protection.”); Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 377 (“The modifications to a work must 
themselves be original, for a nonoriginal modification can never create something original.  
But that is not enough. The word ‘represent’ recognizes that modifications are not of 
interest in and of themselves, but only in that they point to or symbolize something 
broader. To consider whether modifications make a derivative work, we cannot just look at 
the modifications themselves, but must look at whether the modifications represent an 
original work.”). 
66 Shipley & Hay, supra note 61, at 130 n.45 (indicating that the derivative right 
“arguably is superfluous because an adaptation ‘reproduces’ the underlying work.”); 
Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 326 (noting that it may be unclear how the derivative right 
can “be distinguished from the reproduction right in cases in which the creation of an 
adaptation also involves the copying of some expression from the original work”); 
Goldstein, supra note 3, at 215 (“The English and American history reflects both a 
growing commitment to derivative rights and a clear sense that the proper measure for 
their infringement will often necessarily differ from the measure employed in cases 
involving the narrower reproduction right. Yet virtually none of the decisions has drawn a 
principled line capable of separating derivative rights from reproduction rights . . . .”). 
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abuse.67 Scholars have offered a number of distinctions between the 
two rights to help resolve this problem.68 Professor Goldstein has 
suggested that the derivative right applies at “that point at which the 
contribution of independent expression to an existing work effectively 
creates a new work for a different market.”69 He thus suggests that 
“the proper question to ask in determining whether an exclusive right 
should be given to prepare [such] works is whether the grant of such a 
right is needed to attract the appropriate amount of investment to the 
underlying work’s expression, and to channel this investment in 
appropriate directions.”70 Professor Samuelson has suggested that the 
derivative right applies where: (1) the author has contributed “some 
original expression” to the work; (2) the second work’s expression is 
“intermingled with [the] expression from the underlying work” such 
that the expression has been transformed or is otherwise 
“distinguishable from the underlying work”; and (3) the second work 
will supplant demand for authorized derivatives, although not 
necessarily the underlying work itself.71 Additionally, Professor 
Michael Abramowicz has suggested that a derivative work “would be 
expected to cause significant demand diversion from actual or 
hypothetical transformations that the original author plausibly might 
make,” as opposed to a work that would cause demand diversion from 
the original, which would infringe the reproduction right.72 He has 
further noted that the significance of the derivative right lies later in 
the copyright term, when interest for the original work wanes but may 
still exist for derivatives such as sequels and adaptations.73 Thus, the 
existence of a distinct market for the second work, which bears some 
degree of originality but also borrows some expression from the first 
work, appears to be the touchstone of the derivative work right.74 
 
67 Deneau, supra note 44, at 97 (arguing that the derivative work right should be 
eliminated so as to “prevent future encroachments on ideas and confusion in the 
application of copyright law” since the derivative work right is “‘superfluous’”). 
68 See infra notes 69–73. 
69 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 217. 
70 Id. at 230. 
71 Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1522–23. 
72 Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 373. 
73 Id. at 322. 
74 See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(determining that a sped-up version of a video game constituted a derivative work because 
the right to market it was valuable, unlike the right to market, for example, a sped-up 
record); Goldstein, supra note 3, at 217 (“[M]otion pictures, translations and comic strips 
based on the novel will all infringe the derivative right because they add new expressive 
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Confusion over the scope of the derivative right is not limited to 
the overlap with the reproduction right. Some have suggested that 
there is tension with the fair use defense.75 As noted above, the fair 
use defense is intended to shield certain types of uses (e.g., criticism, 
news reporting, education, research76) of existing works from 
liability. However, it also moderates the Act’s property rights by 
allowing others to reference otherwise-protected works.77 
Accordingly, “a secondary work may constitute a fair use even if it 
serves some purpose” other than those listed in the statute, namely 
where it is used in the creation of something that conveys a 
fundamentally different perspective in the form of new aesthetics, 
expression, meaning, or message.78 Analysis of the defense proceeds 
by considering the four statutory factors: (a) the purpose and character 
of the use, (b) the nature of the works, (c) the amount and 
substantiality of the taking, and (d) the market impact of the use.79 
The “purpose and character” factor focuses on the “transformative” 
nature of the second work.80 The distinction between the sphere 
protected by the derivative right and that insulated against 
infringement claims by the fair use defense appears to lie with the 
intention behind the transformation. A derivative work transforms the 
original work in such a way as to take advantage of a distinct but 
logical extension of the original market, while a “fair use” of a work 
either transforms the work for a protected purpose, such as criticism, 
or otherwise changes the underlying message.81 Similarly, the 
 
elements and serve markets that differ from the market in which the original was first 
introduced.”). 
75 Bohannan, supra note 43, at 594 (arguing that “there is tension” between the 
derivative work right and the fair use defense); Hemnes, supra note 17, at 187–88 (“Both 
tradition and the Copyright Act hold that off-shoots such as commentary, criticism, and 
parody are not infringing, despite the fact that such works are fundamentally parasitic on 
the work of the original author. The commentary must not paraphrase or quote so 
extensively that it becomes a substitute for the original . . .  .”). 
76 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
77 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Because excessively broad 
protection would stifle, rather than advance, the law’s objective, fair use doctrine mediates 
between the property rights copyright law establishes in creative works, which must be 
protected up to a point, and the ability of authors, artists, and the rest of us to express 
them—or ourselves by reference to the works of others, which must be protected up to a 
point.” (citation omitted) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
78 Id. at 706, 708. 
79 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
80 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
81 The central inquiry of the “purpose and character of the use” aspect of the fair use 
test is whether the new work is intended merely to “supersede the objects of the original 
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derivative right—which allows an author to take advantage of new 
markets built upon goodwill accrued for past works—may have 
significant overlap with aspects of unfair competition and trademark 
law, which are focused on protecting brand identity and preventing 
consumer confusion.82 
Commentators have offered a number of rationales for extending 
copyright protection to derivative works.83 First, the derivative right 
may provide a valuable incentive for the creation of works, like 
copyright protection in general, as authors may create works with the 
expectation that they will be able to take advantage of derivative 
markets.84 Indeed, in some cases, the introduction of a derivative 
work into the market may actually increase demand for the original 
 
creation” or is “transformative” in that it “adds something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 579). In Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 
132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998), the court found that the second work infringed the derivative 
work right but was not sufficiently transformative to merit fair use protection, noting that: 
Although derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright transform an 
 original work into a new mode of presentation, such works—unlike works of fair 
use—take expression for purposes that are not “transformative.” In the instant 
case, since [the infringing work] has transformed [the original work’s] expression 
into trivia quiz book form with little, if any, transformative purpose, the first fair 
use factor weighs against defendants. 
Id. Professor Bohannan has suggested that this means that, when evaluating whether a 
work is transformative for purposes of the fair use test, a court “would be precluded from 
taking into account only those changes which were incidental to converting the original 
work into another form or medium.” Bohannan, supra note 43, at 603. 
82 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 220 (suggesting that some elements taken from one work 
when adapted to a different medium “though not protected by copyright, may be protected 
under unfair competition or trademark law”); see also Hemnes, supra note 17, at 221 
(“Trademark law and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act share the broad purposes of 
protecting a first user’s exclusive right to profit from the goodwill he has generated and of 
protecting the public against ‘false designations of origin.’ Thus, trademark law recognizes 
a right in the first user of a mark to make all of the profit derived from the goodwill 
associated with a mark and to prevent unfair or deceptive use of the same or confusingly 
similar marks by other persons. By contrast, protection for the economic interests of the 
copyright owner is more limited. The owner’s profits are not an end in themselves, but 
only a means to the constitutional goal of encouraging the development of ‘science and the 
useful arts.’”). 
83 See infra notes 84–89. 
84 Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1527; Sterk, supra note 7, at 1215–16; see also 
Goldstein, supra note 3, at 230 (“[T]he proper question to ask in determining whether an 
exclusive right should be given to prepare these latter works is whether the grant of such a 
right is needed to attract the appropriate amount of investment to the underlying work’s 
expression, and to channel this investment in appropriate directions.”). 
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work.85 Second, the derivative right provides authors with the power 
to determine what markets to exploit, rather than forcing their hand to 
hastily prepare derivative works to compete in a crowded market 
flooded with derivatives created by others.86 Third, authors “deserve” 
some degree of compensation for the right to exploit their own works, 
both to preclude unjust enrichment of third parties who would 
otherwise exploit the foreseeable markets and to preserve the integrity 
of an inherent aspect of the authors’ own creative identity.87 Fourth, 
the derivative right reduces transaction costs by giving one copyright 
owner power over reproduction and derivative rights.88 Fifth, as an 
administrative matter, it may be too difficult to distinguish between 
protecting an original work and a derivative work.89 
3. Criticism 
Some academics and practitioners have fiercely criticized the 
derivative work right. Professors Stewart Sterk and Christina 
Bohannan have argued that the incentive justification is ill-founded 
and contend that derivative rights only provide significant creative 
incentives in the rare circumstances where the projected returns from 
the work itself are low, but projected returns from derivative works 
are high enough to justify the author’s effort to create the work.90  
 
85 Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 328 (noting that “adaptation might increase sales of the 
original, perhaps explaining the lamentable practice of placing movie stills on the covers 
of books that have been adapted”); see also Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1520 (“In some 
cases, motion-picture versions of a book may create positive demand for the original 
version.”); Hemnes, supra note 17, at 185–87 (noting that a court found infringement 
despite the fact that the infringing work did not act as a substitute for the original, and if 
anything, would have enhanced sales of the original). 
86 Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1528; Sterk, supra note 7, at 1216–17 (citing William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325, 354–55 (1989)); Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 320 (“The derivative right thus can be 
defended as a tool that allows authors to take their time. Less obviously, but perhaps just 
as importantly, the derivative right may enhance social welfare, even placing aside the 
potentially destructiveness of copyright races.”), 324–25 (“The derivative right also 
eliminates copyright races to create adaptations, allowing the original author time to create 
a relatively high-quality work and to build audience anticipation.”). 
87 Sterk, supra note 7, at 1227, 1230; Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1528. 
88 Sterk, supra note 7, at 1216–17 (citing Landes & Posner, supra note 86, at 354–55). 
89 Id. at 1217 (“If derivative-works protection has any significant economic basis, that 
basis must rest on the administrative difficulty of distinguishing preparation of a derivative 
work from copying an original work.”). 
90 Id. at 1215–16 (“One argument for giving authors copyright in derivative works is 
that the prospect of profits from derivative works is necessary to create adequate 
incentives for production of the original. The argument is persuasive only in those 
situations when (1) the projected returns from the original work are too small to justify the 
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Professor Sterk has also argued that “[t]he notion that authors 
‘deserve’ copyright protection . . . rests on shaky foundations,”91 
rejecting suggestions that copyright protection can be justified based 
on notions of what authors deserve, whether predicated on principles 
of corrective justice, distributive justice, or personal identity.92 
Instead, Professor Sterk and others suggest that the Act’s broad 
copyright protections are a product of special interest influence.93 The 
primary problem these commentators see with a broad derivative right 
is that it precludes other authors from building upon prior works and 
creating new works for the benefit of the public at large.94 They 
contend that the derivative right should be eliminated or significantly 
scaled back.95 
Some scholars have also suggested narrower readings of the 
derivative right. Professor Bohannan has suggested that ambiguities 
in the Copyright Act should be construed against the special interests 
that helped create them.96 Professor Samuelson has persuasively 
 
costs of production, and (2) the projected returns from the derivative work are so large 
relative to the cost of producing the derivative work that the difference will more than 
make up the projected deficit on the original work alone.”); Bohannan, supra note 43, at 
589 (“[B]ecause a derivative work involves an expenditure to adapt the original work into 
a new form, and there is a low ex ante probability that any particular work will be 
successful enough to justify producing the derivative work, authors are not likely to count 
on derivative works as a source of income sufficient to justify producing the original 
work.”). 
91 Sterk, supra note 7, at 1239. 
92 Id. at 1230–44. 
93 Id. at 1244 (“[M]uch in the history of twentieth-century copyright legislation 
suggests that those industries have used political muscle to expand protection at public 
expense.”); Bohannan, supra note 43, at 586 (suggesting that protection for derivative 
works is a “product of special-interest influence” that is “difficult to justify on economic 
grounds”). 
94 Bohannan, supra note 43, at 590 (“Because a broad derivative works right prevents 
second-comers from creating new works based on existing works while providing little 
incentive to create the original works, it seems likely that the costs of the right outweigh 
the benefits.”); see also Deneau, supra note 44, at 91 (“The derivative work right promotes 
the growth of such dangerous monopolies, because it can only separately protect against 
insubstantial copying of ideas, not expression.”). 
95 Deneau, supra note 44, at 97 (arguing that the derivative work right should be 
deleted so as to “prevent future encroachments on ideas and confusion in the application of 
copyright law” since the derivative work right is “‘superfluous’”); Bohannan, supra note 
43, at 588 (conceding that the reasons for protecting reproductions against copying “might 
justify a narrow derivative works right, or a right that protects against substantially 
copying the original work in a new form or medium”). 
96 Bohannan, supra note 43, at 569–70 (“Although the Copyright Act has its roots in 
the public interest, which it serves by encouraging the creation and dissemination of 
expressive works, the general trend in copyright law has been an expansion of the rights of 
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argued that the broad language in the statutory definition of 
“derivative work” should be read narrowly such that the broad, final 
clause in the statutory definition (“or any other form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted”) “should be construed in light 
of the nine exemplary derivatives.”97 This interpretation would limit 
the derivative work right to foreseeable and proximate markets for the 
three main statutory categories of derivative works (i.e., shorter 
versions, faithful renditions, and medium or genre transformations) 
and “close analogues.”98 Still, others like Professor Goldstein appear 
to be more comfortable with a robust derivative work right, seeing it 
as a reflection of the growth of new industries and development of 
new media.99 Regardless of how one views the derivative work right, 
however, it is firmly ingrained in the Copyright Act and is unlikely to 
disappear anytime soon. 
C. Substantial Similarity 
In order to prevail, “[a] plaintiff bringing a claim for copyright 
infringement must demonstrate ‘(1) ownership of a valid copyright, 
and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are 
original.’”100 However, a defendant need not create an exact copy to 
infringe.101 To prove copying, the plaintiff must establish not only 
 
copyright owners at the expense of public access and improvements to copyrighted works. 
This tension between private and public interests in copyright law often presents itself in 
copyright infringement cases as a statutory ambiguity between private- and public-interest 
provisions in the Copyright Act. This Article argues that, where possible, such statutory 
ambiguities in the interpretation of the Act should be resolved by a rule of interpretation 
that reclaims copyright for the public interest. Pursuant to this rule of interpretation, 
ambiguities between private- and public-interest provisions should be resolved by 
construing the private-interest provision narrowly and the public-interest provision 
broadly.”). 
97 Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1517–20. 
98 Id. at 1559 (“The derivative work right most clearly extends to works operating in 
foreseeable markets such as those implicated by the nine exemplary derivatives in the 
statutory definition and close analogues. The rationales for granting derivative work rights  
. . . also anticipate foreseeable markets. For example, incentives to create new works of 
authorship may be grounded for some creators upon expectations of rights to recoup 
research-and-development costs through control over readily foreseeable markets, such as 
the nine exemplary derivatives in the definition. But if first-generation creators do not 
foresee opportunities in remote markets, it is unclear that their incentives to create will be 
diminished if others perceive and then act on the imagined new market.”). 
99 See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 209–11. 
100  Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). 
101  Shipley & Hay, supra note 61, at 130 (“[C]opyright is infringed by the substantial 
appropriation of the author’s ‘particular expression through similarities of treatment, 
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that the defendant actually copied the work, but also that “the copying 
is illegal because a substantial similarity exists between the 
defendant’s work and the protect[a]ble elements of plaintiff’s 
work.”102 In cases where infringement is disputed, substantial 
similarity is often dispositive.103 The issue most frequently arises in 
cases where the reproduction right is at issue,104 and creates some 
unique problems in the context of the derivative right.105 
1. Test 
The circuits are not in total agreement on the test for substantial 
similarity.106 All courts appear to regard it as a question of fact and 
generally apply some variation of the “ordinary observer or audience 
test.”107 These variations of the test seek to determine “whether the 
accused work is so similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary 
reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully 
appropriated the plaintiff’s protect[a]ble expression by taking material 
of substance and value.”108 Generally, courts may first engage in 
some form of “filtering” to remove the unprotectable elements of the 
 
details, scenes, events and characterization.’ Infringement may result from ‘imitation, 
paraphrasing, or colorable alteration’ as well as literal copying.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
102  Belair v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(alteration marks omitted). Some language in Ninth Circuit opinions suggests that a 
plaintiff who can establish direct copying need not show substantial similarity. E.g., Funky 
Films, 462 F.3d at 1076 (“Absent evidence of direct copying, ‘proof of infringement 
involves fact-based showings that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work and that 
the two works are substantially similar.’” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). As Nimmer suggests, this is not very persuasive. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B] at 13-8 to 13-9 (2012) [hereinafter 
“NIMMER”] (arguing that the “copying” element requires an examination of both the 
factual question of whether the defendant used the plaintiff’s material and the legal 
question of whether the defendant’s work is “substantially similar to plaintiff’s work such 
that liability may attach”). The Ninth Circuit, however, has previously limited direct 
copying claims that do not require a showing of substantial similarity to those that involve 
“virtual duplication of a plaintiff’s entire work.” Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910 (9th 
Cir. 1989).  Consequently, the disagreement appears to be largely irrelevant in practice. 
103  E.g., Funky Films, 462 F.3d at 1076–81. 
104  See Hemnes, supra note 17, at 194 (acknowledging “the accepted principle that a 
work can be ‘reproduced in copies’ in violation of the owner’s exclusive rights under 
section 106(1) of the Act if the infringer makes a ‘substantially similar’ copy.” (alteration 
marks and ellipsis omitted)). 
105  See infra Part I.C.4. 
106  See NIMMER, supra note 102, § 13.03[E][1] at 13-92 to 13-93. 
107  Id. 
108  Hemnes, supra note 17, at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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plaintiff’s work before determining whether there is a genuine dispute 
of material fact appropriate for resolution by a jury.109 
Thus, in both the Second and Ninth Circuits, the court will first 
compare the two works, using filtering and expert analysis. Then, the 
court will address whether an ordinary observer would deem the 
works substantially similar, which is usually a question of fact 
reserved for the jury.110 In essence, these variations may be distilled 
as contemplating “a single inquiry: whether a reasonable jury could 
find the [works] substantially similar at the level of protected 
expression.”111 
The substantial similarity test may vary to some degree depending 
on the medium at issue.112 Courts frequently analyze the constituent 
elements of the works.113 For example, for literary works, a court 
might focus on “articulable similarities between the plot, themes, 
dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events in 
 
109  See NIMMER, supra note 102, § 13.03[E][1][b] at 13-98 to 13-100; L.A. Printex 
Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because copyright 
law protects expression of ideas, not ideas themselves, [the court must] distinguish 
protect[a]ble from unprotect[a]ble elements and ask only whether the protect[a]ble 
elements in two works are substantially similar.”); Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. 
Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that, in the Second Circuit, 
“when faced with works ‘that have both protect[a]ble and unprotect[a]ble elements,’ our 
analysis must be ‘more discerning,’ . . . and that we instead ‘must attempt to extract the 
unprotect[a]ble elements from our consideration and ask whether the protect[a]ble 
elements, standing alone, are substantially similar’” (citations omitted)); Funky Films, Inc. 
v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (indicating that the 
courts “filter out” unprotectable elements when evaluating substantial similarity). 
110  NIMMER, supra note 102, § 13.03[E][3][a][i] at 13-105 to 13-106 (discussing the 
test formulated by Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946)); L.A. Printex, 676 F.3d 
at 848 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s two-part “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” test); Peter F. 
Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 66 (discussing the Second Circuit test). 
111  Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 n.5 (11th Cir. 
2008); see also NIMMER, supra note 102, § 13.03[E][3][c] at 13-118 to 13-119 (discussing 
Oravec with approval). 
112  See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
113  See infra notes 114–15. This may also raise questions about what aspects of a work 
actually constitute expression. This may not always be the same thing as the aspects that 
make the work valuable. For example, for some art, the artist’s story itself is part of the 
value. See What Do We Value Most?, NPR: TED RADIO HOUR (Apr. 25, 2012 11:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=151357124. For example, 
Marla Olmstead sold paintings for thousands of dollars at the age of three. Id. When 
questions were raised about whether her father was helping her create the paintings, they 
dropped dramatically in value. Id.; see also Rebecca Leung, New Questions About Child 
Prodigy, CBS NEWS (Feb. 22, 2005), www.cbsnews.com/2100-500164_162-675522.html. 
This may affect the elements of the work that should be evaluated, but may be more of an 
issue of unfair competition law as it raises fundamental questions about authenticity. 
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the two works.”114 For visual artwork, in contrast, the court might 
focus on “the subject matter, shapes, colors, materials, and 
arrangement of the representations.”115 Similarly, a comparison of 
photographs might focus on the subject, themes, setting, props, 
wardrobes, angles of view, framing, poses, shading, and lighting.116 
How these elements are assessed may vary to some degree between 
the circuits. The Ninth Circuit has endorsed analytic dissection—i.e., 
the process of comparing the two works’ constituent elements.117 The 
Second Circuit, although invoking many of the constituent elements, 
remains somewhat resistant, insisting that the ultimate focus remains 
on the work’s “total concept and feel.”118 
2. Degree of Similarity Required 
Two works need not be identical in order to support a finding of 
substantial similarity. “[T]he relevant inquiry is whether a substantial 
portion of the protect[a]ble material in the plaintiff’s work was 
appropriated—not whether a substantial portion of defendant’s work 
was derived from plaintiff’s work.”119 In other words, “no plagiarist 
can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not 
pirate.”120 “[A]ssuming that particular material is copyrightable, a 
determination of the qualitative importance of the material to the 
plaintiff’s work is more significant than a quantitative calculation of 
the portion allegedly appropriated by the defendant.”121 In contrast, 
“if . . . the similarity is only as to nonessential matters, then a finding 
of no substantial similarity should result.”122 By way of illustration, 
 
114  Funky Films, 462 F.3d at 1077 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
115  Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). 
116  See L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); LaChapelle v. 
Fenty, 812 F. Supp. 2d 434, 445–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
117  Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398 & n.3 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
118  Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that when 
employing the Second Circuit’s “more discerning” ordinary observer test, “a court is not to 
dissect the works at issue into separate components and compare only the copyrightable 
elements”). 
119  Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 570 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987). 
120  Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936). 
121  Worth, 827 F.2d at 570 n.1; see also Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1363 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (“Even if a copied portion be relatively small in proportion to the entire work, if 
qualitatively important, the finder of fact may properly find substantial similarity.” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
122  NIMMER, supra note 102, § 13.03[A][2][a] at 13–55. 
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inexact or nonliteral similarity of twenty percent of one film was 
sufficient to constitute infringement where it constituted “an integral 
and essential part” of the story.123 Although generally not sufficient to 
warrant a finding of substantial similarity, if distinctive enough, an 
exact copy of a phrase or sentence can also amount to a “substantial 
taking.”124 In this respect, substantial similarity is related to the de 
minimis doctrine.125 
3. Use of Expert Analysis 
Not all courts or commentators accept the use of expert analysis. 
Some fear that experts may mislead jurors, causing them to focus on 
irrelevancies.126 Nonetheless, expert analysis appears to be generally 
accepted in cases involving media that untrained laypersons are less 
qualified to evaluate, such as musical works and computer 
programs.127 Similarly, expert analysis may be useful in analyzing 
emerging media.128 
 
123  Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947). 
124  NIMMER, supra note 102, § 13.03[A][2][a] at 13-59 n.113 (citing as examples, 
“[w]hen there is no room in hell . . . the dead will walk the earth” from the film Dawn of 
the Dead and “I love you E.T.” from the film E.T.). 
125  Julie D. Cromer, Harry Potter and the Three-Second Crime: Are We Vanishing the 
De Minimis Defense from Copyright Law?, 36 N.M. L. REV. 261, 271 (2006). 
126  See, e.g., Steven G. McKnight, Substantial Similarity Between Video Games: An 
Old Copyright Problem in a New Medium, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1295 (1983) (arguing 
that experts “shed little light on the key issue in copyright infringement actions: whether 
the public believes the two works are substantially similar.  Instead, expert witnesses could 
easily mislead juries by focusing their attention on minor differences or similarities 
between two works that have little bearing on the infringement issue.”). 
127  Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845, 848–49 (9th Cir. 2004) (indicating that, in a 
case involving musical works, assessing substantial similarity “require[d] analytical 
dissection of a work and expert testimony” and further observing that “[t]he application of 
the extrinsic test” to music is an unnatural task as music like software programs and art 
objects, is not capable of ready classification into only five or six constituent elements” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 
693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the use of expert testimony to assess the similarity of 
computer programs and acknowledging the difficulty lay observers may have with the 
subject matter); NIMMER, supra note 102, § 13.03[A][1] at 13-50 (indicating that “expert 
testimony is essential to any analysis of the similarities between computer programs”); 
Howard Root, Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the 
Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1286–87 (1984) (“Because computer 
programs possess a general aesthetic feel only from their functioning and output, however, 
expert testimony is needed to uncover any similarities between the actual programs.”). 
128  Hemnes, supra note 17, at 217–18 (“It is submitted that in unusual contexts, such as 
video games, the admission of evidence, both expert and otherwise, about other works 
similar to the copyrighted and accused works, should become standard practice. Such 
evidence would provide valuable information about the standard devices (scenes a faire) 
found in games similar to the ones involved in the suit at hand. Such evidence would also 
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4. Difficulty of Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Derivative 
Works 
Evaluating substantial similarity presents unique problems where 
the plaintiff contends that the defendant has infringed the derivative 
work right. The test for infringement has developed independently of 
the derivative right’s evolution into its present form, making it 
difficult to apply in the derivative context.129 Accordingly, 
modifications to whichever variation of the test is applicable may be 
necessary when the infringement claim implicates the derivative 
right.130 Additionally, expert analysis may be particularly useful in 
determining whether a derivative market exists for a given work.131 
Notably, some commentators have suggested that the substantial 
similarity test should not apply when assessing an alleged 
infringement of the derivative work right.132 However, the weight of 
authority is to the contrary.133 The substantial similarity test also 
 
allow the courts to place their comparison of the copyrighted and allegedly infringing 
games into the context in which the games are actually created and played. The routine use 
of such evidence would guard against over-broad copyright protection, and at the same 
time facilitate a less metaphysical and more policy-oriented approach to infringement 
issues. Over time, as the courts’ experience catches up with new medium, the need for 
such evidence can be expected to diminish.”). 
129  See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 219 (“The rules on copyright infringement were 
shaped in the years before derivative rights were added to the statute, when the only 
question for decision was whether defendant’s work constituted a copy of plaintiff’s.”). 
130  See Wurzer, supra note 57, at 1535–36. 
131  See Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that the 
plaintiff had “shown through the affidavits of competent experts that photographers may 
earn additional income through the sale of ‘art rendering’ rights, namely, creating an art 
work based on the photograph in a medium other than photography”). 
132  Chandra Gehri Spencer, Comment, Beware of the Highwayman on the Information 
Superhighway: A Balanced Proposal to Protect Copyrights Within the National 
Information Infrastructure, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 121, 170 (1996) (“The Working Group [on 
Intellectual Property Rights of the federal interagency Information Infrastructure Task 
Force] suggests that the substantial similarity test should not be applied to derivative 
works because ‘neither the meaning of derivative work nor the statutory standard for 
infringement appears to require an infringing derivative work to be substantially similar.” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mtima, supra note 41, at 57 n.179 
(suggesting that some authorities suggest that adaptation can violate the derivative right 
even in an absence of substantial similarity, explaining: “for example, where a novel is 
loosely adapted into a movie or its recognizable characters are used in another story 
without permission, the derivative work right is infringed despite the fact that there may be 
no reproduction of protected expression in the ordinary sense”). 
133  Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 993–94 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (indicating that the 
“substantial similarity” requirement should be applied to determine if a work infringed the 
derivative right); Shipley & Hay, supra note 61, at 131 n.48. 
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applies when the two works at issue are in different media.134 Indeed, 
the outcome of the substantial similarity test may effectively dictate 
whether a work is “based upon” another work for the purposes of 
implicating the derivative right.135 
Additionally, the fact that a defendant has copied the plaintiff’s 
work in a different medium will not preclude a finding of 
infringement based on substantial similarity.136 Accordingly, for 
example, courts have held that photographs could infringe 
choreography,137 a music video could infringe photographs,138 a 
sculpture could infringe a photograph,139 a quiz book could infringe a 
television show,140 and a three-dimensional toy could infringe a two-
dimensional cartoon character.141 Some courts that have 
acknowledged that a change in medium will not preclude a finding of 
infringement have specifically cited the codification of the derivative 
 
134  Belair v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 2d 687, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“It is well 
established that ‘substantial similarity may be found even where the protected work and 
the accused work exist in entirely different media.’” (quoting LaChapelle v. Fenty, 812 F. 
Supp. 2d 434, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2011))). 
135  Integral Sys., Inc. v. Peoplesoft, Inc., No. C–90–2598–DLJ, 1991 WL 498874, at 
*12 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“The only basis for reaching a conclusion that a work is ‘based 
upon’ another is if there is substantial similarity between the two.”). But cf. Kwall, supra 
note 5, at 43 (noting that in contract disputes, some courts have used tests other than the 
substantial similarity test to determine whether a derivative work was “based upon” a 
preexisting work). 
136  Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618–19 n.12 
(7th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 
772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985), and Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 
(7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Univ. Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1979); Rogers, 
751 F. Supp. at 477 (“[Defendant’s] effort to limit that protection to [a] photograph ‘as a 
photograph’ runs counter to caselaw. In copyright law the medium is not the message, and 
a change in medium does not preclude infringement. That has long been the rule of this 
Court and the Second Circuit.”). 
137  Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 158, 163 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that the 
district court “erroneously held that still photographs cannot infringe choreography” in a 
case where the estate of a choreographer sought to enjoin the publication of a book 
portraying photographs of a production of The Nutcracker). 
138  LaChapelle, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (finding that photographer David LaChapelle 
“successfully alleged” that Rihanna’s music video for the song “S & M” “embodie[d] 
substantial similarities to protect[a]ble elements in” LaChapelle’s photographs). 
139  Rogers, 751 F. Supp. at 477 (finding that the defendant’s “reproduction of the 
[plaintiff’s] photograph in sculpture form does not preclude a finding of copyright 
infringement”). 
140  Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 
1998) (finding the fact that a quiz book allegedly infringing the Seinfeld television series 
was “in question and answer form is by itself without particular consequence”). 
141  Rogers, 751 F. Supp. at 477–78 (citing King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 
533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924)). 
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work right as support for the proposition.142 Of course, there may be 
many instances where a work in a different medium does not infringe 
the plaintiff’s work.143 
II 
THE PROBLEM: APPLYING THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST TO 
WORKS IN DIFFERENT MEDIA 
As discussed in the previous Part, it is apparent that a defendant 
may infringe a copyright owner’s right to prepare derivatives by 
creating an infringing work in a different medium.144 It is also clear 
that the substantial similarity test should be used to determine whether 
the defendant’s work infringes the original work.145 The substantial 
similarity test, however, becomes problematic when utilized to 
compare works in different media.146 As illustrated below, this is 
because a change in medium necessarily dictates changes in 
expression in the works that may cause two works that are actually 
similar to appear different.147 
For example, in Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged 
that the defendants’ film The Peacemaker infringed a story set out in 
eight written works that they had developed and owned.148 On 
summary judgment, the court dutifully set out to compare the works’ 
plots, themes, dialogue, moods, pacing, settings, characters, and 
sequences of events.149 When it reached “mood and pace,” however, 
the court stalled, noting that “it is always difficult to compare ‘mood 
 
142  See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618–
19 n.12 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)), abrogated on other grounds as 
recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985), 
and Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012). 
143  Goldstein, supra note 3, at 228–29 (noting “decisions acknowledging that 
copyrighted architectural drawings are not infringed by buildings constructed from them, 
that traffic control systems are not infringed by bridges that embody them, and that a book 
on sales techniques is not infringed by a motion picture illustrating those techniques”). 
144  See supra Part I. 
145  See id. 
146  Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“Because in the instant case the original and secondary works are of different 
genres and to a lesser extent because they are in different media, tests for substantial 
similarity other than the quantitative/qualitative approach are not particularly helpful to 
our analysis.”). 
147  See infra Part II. 
148  162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1143–55 (C.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d, 90 F. App’x 496, 498 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
149  Id. at 1177–78. 
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and pace’ between works which are captured in different media 
(written word versus film).”150 Nonetheless, it proceeded to make the 
comparison between the plaintiffs’ writings and the defendants’ 
film.151 It determined that “to the extent that” the elements could be 
discerned in the works, there was no substantial similarity.152 
The Idema court has not been alone in struggling to evaluate the 
substantial similarity of works in different media. In Capcom Co., 
Ltd. v. MKR Group, Inc., the court noted the same difficulty when 
attempting to compare the mood of a film and the mood of a video 
game.153 In Thomas v. Walt Disney Co., the court observed that it was 
“virtually impossible to compare the pace of [the plaintiff’s] eleven 
page story with that of [the defendants’] feature length film,” and 
refused to even try.154 In Duckhole Inc. v. NBC Universal Media 
LLC, the court found that it could not compare the pace and dialogue 
of the plaintiff’s treatment for a prospective television series with the 
defendants’ television series because the treatment did not include 
any dialogue, and the defendant’s series “was fully developed into a 
television show with distinctive pace and scripted dialogue.”155 
Worse yet, other courts have appeared to conclude that differences 
attributable to the medium were significant.156 
The difficulty in these cases arises because the manner in which 
authors communicate their expression to their audience varies 
depending on the medium. For example, Professor Goldstein has 
described the process of adapting a novel into a film as follows: 
The first step “in adapting a book for the screen is to pare it down, 
cut it back to the basics and distill it into what movie people call its 
‘filmable elements.’” . . . As a book is transformed into a movie or 
television series, descriptive passages drop out and the actors’ and 
set designers’ skills substitute for the novelist’s detailed 
characterization and scenic descriptions. Screenplays, it has been 
 
150  Id. at 1185. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  No. C 08-0904 RS, 2008 WL 4661479, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2008) (citing 
Idema, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1185). 
154  No. C-07-4392 CW, 2008 WL 425647, at *5 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (citing 
Idema, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1185), aff’d, 337 F. App’x 694 (9th Cir. 2009). 
155  No. CV 12-10077 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL 5797279, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013). 
156  Wild v. NBC Universal, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(indicating that the dialogue of the plaintiff’s graphic novel was “extremely limited, 
simplistic and cliche-ridden” as “[i]t is, after all, a comic book,” while the defendant’s 
television show contained “detailed, complex, and relatively sophisticated” dialogue), 
aff’d, 513 F. App’x 640 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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noted, are “barely readable conglomerations of dialogue, camera 
directions, setting descriptions, and character analysis.” The 
standard form of literary agreement typically gives the producer the 
unquestioned right to alter the property at will. The first draft 
screenplay will invariably be rewritten in the course of filming and 
editing. Sometimes all that will be left of the original work is little 
more than the title. The result may be a motion picture that is truer 
to the novel than any more literal, plodding imitation could possibly 
be. But has expression been taken and not just ideas?157 
As illustrated by Professor Goldstein’s description, the problem 
that becomes apparent is that a change in medium necessarily dictates 
other changes that might then suggest that the works are not 
substantially similar.158 Indeed, the distinctions dictated by the 
change in medium are readily apparent, likely drawing the attention 
of the ordinary observer.159 This problem may explain some of the 
 
157  Goldstein, supra note 3, at 219–20; see also Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1520 
(“Dramatizations and motion-picture versions transform expressive elements of the plot, 
structure, characters, narrative thread, and the like of the underlying work to a different 
medium. Often, numerous changes are necessitated by the change in medium.”). 
158  Kwall, supra note 5, at 46–47 (“Application of the ‘substantial similarity’ test . . . is 
extremely problematic, particularly in the context of adaptations. . . . The use of this test 
with respect to derivative and preexisting works requires caution . . . because the technical 
requirements of a different medium usually necessitate certain changes, which could lull 
an ordinary observer into believing that no substantial similarity exists.”); Wurzer, supra 
note 57, at 1532–33 (noting that “derivative works necessarily differ in form from the 
original and, therefore, strict application of the substantial similarity test may not be 
appropriate in derivative works cases”); Goldstein, supra note 3, at 7-8 (noting that in 
Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 668 
F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981), the court recognized “that ‘there will be some differences between 
a motion picture and the book upon which it is based because of differences in the nature 
of the medias’”); see also Shipley & Hay, supra note 61, at 131 n.51 (“Determining 
whether an adaptation infringes another’s copyright is not easy unless it is a very close 
reproduction. The transformations often may be so great that it is difficult to see any 
connection between the works.”). 
159  Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 139–40 (2d Cir. 
1998) (finding the “ordinary observer” test was unhelpful to compare a television series 
and quiz book as “in the usual case, we might question whether any ‘ordinary observer’ 
would ‘regard the aesthetic appeal’ in a situation-comedy television program as being 
identical to that of any book, let alone a trivia quiz book, about that program”); Hemnes, 
supra note 17, at 226 (“[T]he ordinary observer test has profound limitations. Nimmer, for 
example, argues that the test may fail to uncover instances of copying, such as the 
conversion of a novel into a derivative work such as a movie, in which ‘the immediate and 
spontaneous observations of a person untrained in the special requirements and techniques 
of the play, the novel, the short story, and the motion picture, may fail to note similarities 
which, if analyzed and dissected, would be only too apparent.”); Wurzer, supra note 57, at 
1549 n.158 (“Derivative works, by definition, are adapted from the original and, therefore, 
they may not seem similar to the ordinary observer.”). 
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confusion over whether a showing of substantial similarity is 
necessary to establish infringement of the derivative work right.160 
Some have suggested that changes in media are relevant to an 
assessment of substantial similarity,161 the argument being that if the 
differences are so significant that the ordinary observer cannot detect 
any similarities, then the plaintiff’s rights have not been harmed by 
the allegedly infringing work in a different medium.162 The 
overwhelming majority of courts and commentators, however, have 
rejected this view.163 Indeed, infringement in this context may be 
more alarming than infringement of the reproduction right because it 
implicates an untapped market, rather than one that has already been 
exploited.164 
Some contend that the substantial similarity test needs to be 
reformed to specifically address distinctions in medium.165 Many, 
however, have persuasively suggested that differences dictated by a 
change in medium must be “filtered out” akin to unprotectable 
elements.166 Accordingly, experts may be particularly helpful in the 
 
160  See articles cited supra note 132. 
161  See Crane v. Poetic Prods. Ltd., 593 F. Supp. 2d 585, 594–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(citing distinctions between a play and nonfiction book that appeared to be dictated by the 
change in medium as significant for the purposes of assessing substantial similarity, and 
concluding that the defendant “not only ha[d] his own ‘distinct style and wording,’ he 
ha[d] his own distinct medium”). 
162  See McKnight, supra note 126, at 1290–91 (“If the public perceives the two works 
as distinct, then the public gains from having both works. Similarly, if ordinary members 
of the public cannot recognize the similarity between an original work and an allegedly 
infringing work, the allegedly infringing work probably has not damaged the original 
work’s value in the marketplace.”). 
163  See supra notes 136–41 and infra note 166. 
164  Kwall, supra note 5, at 47 n.179 (“[A] creator’s loss may be greater when his work 
is appropriated, without his permission, into a different medium ‘for here his work is made 
available to a new untapped market whereas if the infringing work were in the original 
medium, it would only attract the same persons who already had had an opportunity to 
purchase the plaintiff’s work.”). 
165  Swatee L. Mehta, Note, Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 49, 50 (2000) (discussing “how the substantial similarity test may 
be improved by developing variants which address the creative and incentive needs for 
different kinds of works, both in terms of medium and market”). 
166  See Data E. USA, Inc. v. EPYX, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988) (suggesting 
that the constraints inherent in the use of a specific home video game system were not 
relevant in the substantial similarity comparison because they were “not protectable”); 
Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that the plaintiff had to “show substantial similarity between the photograph and 
the sculpture to sustain a claim of infringement, and that the differences in size, texture 
and color preclude such a finding” and noting that it was “really the discredited ‘substitute 
medium’ argument in a different form”); see also Goldstein, supra note 3, at 232 (“The 
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context of works in different media to educate the trier of fact about 
the differences that are dictated by the change in media and those that 
are voluntary, which may not be intuitive for a court or a jury.167 
Thus, as Professor Goldstein explains, infringement may exist where 
there are “equivalent” elements that differ only because the 
differences are “attributable to the changes in format.”168 “So, for 
example, in the case of a novel transformed into a motion picture or 
television series, it should be recognized that scenic descriptions will 
be transmuted into visual depictions and that character development 
through interior monologue will be transformed by the actor’s 
professional contribution to his or her role.”169 Of course, for 
infringement to occur, the infringing work must still incorporate a 
portion of the infringed work’s expression in some form.170 
There appears to be wide agreement that, in this context, 
infringement must be assessed in light of the economic justification 
for recognizing the derivative right.171 Thus, the existence of a 
foreseeable market for the derivative work will drive the analysis.172 
Professor Samuelson has noted that some creators may create works 
with the expectation that they will be able to exploit derivative 
 
court should again first determine the extent of protectable expression in the underlying 
[work], and should next determine the extent to which the expression has been copied in 
the alleged infringing form, taking into account the changes required when a work is 
transferred from one format to another. This last step, commonly taken by courts 
determining whether a work in one format, such as a motion picture, infringes a work in 
another, expressively different format, such as a novel, is necessary if derivative rights are 
to be given their intended full effect.”). 
167  See Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618-19 n.12 
(7th Cir. 1982) (noting “that in some cases it may be important to educate the trier of fact 
as to such considerations in order to preserve the author’s rights under the Copyright 
Act”), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, 
Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985), and Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 
755 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Wurzer, supra note 57, at 1549 n.158 (indicating that 
“experts are needed to elucidate the similarities between the works”). 
168  Goldstein, supra note 3, at 226. 
169  Id. 
170  Kwall, supra note 5, at 45 n.170 (noting that according to the legislative history, in 
order “[t]o constitute a violation of section 106(2), the infringing work must incorporate a 
portion of the copyrighted work in some form; for example, a detailed commentary on a 
work or a programmatic musical composition inspired by a novel would not normally 
constitute infringements under this clause.”). 
171  See supra notes 69-74 and infra 174–76. 
172  See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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markets—including those in different media.173 It is those foreseeable 
derivative markets that should be protected.174 A related 
consideration is “whether an unauthorized derivative will supplant 
demand for an authorized” adaptation in a different medium.175 
Alternatively, one commentator has suggested that the portion of the 
work that “will generate a significant demand”176 across media 
should be considered the protected expression, which could form the 
basis for a finding of infringement. 
Thus, there appears to be wide—although not unanimous—
agreement that a change in medium should not preclude a finding of 
infringement, and that the differences dictated by the change in 
medium should not be permitted to obscure the similarities when 
evaluating the substantial similarity of two works in different 
media.177 Moreover, although the existing variations of the 
substantial similarity test may be difficult to utilize when attempting 
to compare works in different media, the similarities may be assessed 
using the equivalents specific to each medium.178 And finally, an 
infringement analysis should also proceed against the backdrop of the 
economic incentives that drive copyright law.179 
 
173  Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1559 (“The rationales for granting derivative work 
rights . . . also anticipate foreseeable markets. For example, incentives to create new works 
of authorship may be grounded for some creators upon expectations of rights to recoup 
research-and-development costs through control over readily foreseeable markets, such as 
the nine exemplary derivatives in the definition.”). 
174  See id.; see also Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting 
that the plaintiff had “shown through the affidavits of competent experts that 
photographers may earn additional income through the sale of ‘art rendering’ rights, 
namely, creating an art work based on the photograph in a medium other than 
photography”). But see Mtima, supra note 41, at 8 (noting that for software, a second 
“work should be denied section 117 adaptation status and be treated as a derivative work 
only to the extent that the unauthorized work unduly compromises the commercial market 
interests of the copyright holder in the original program”). 
175  Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1520; see also Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 373 (“If 
the allegedly infringing work would be expected to cause significant demand diversion 
from actual or hypothetical transformations that the original author plausibly might make, 
then it would infringe the derivative right.”); Goldstein, supra note 3, at 217 (indicating 
that “motion pictures, translations and comic strips based on [a] novel will all infringe the 
derivative right because they add new expressive elements and serve markets that differ 
from the market in which the original was first introduced”). 
176  Wurzer, supra note 57, at 1544–45. 
177  See supra notes 6, 136–41, 166. 
178  See supra notes 146, 168–69. 
179  See supra notes 13, 84–85, 171–76 and accompanying text. 
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III 
THE ROLE OF THE FAITHFUL ADAPTATION AS A BENCHMARK 
The widely acknowledged difficulty of assessing the substantial 
similarity of works of different media in their original forms indicates 
that there is a missing step in the analysis. That missing step is the 
faithful translation of the plaintiff’s work into the medium of the 
defendant’s work as the representation of the right allegedly 
infringed: the plaintiff’s right to create derivatives. The resulting 
“faithful adaptation” should serve as a benchmark for comparison 
when applying the traditional variations of the test for determining 
whether the plaintiff’s work is substantially similar to the defendant’s 
work. As discussed further below, however, there must be an 
additional check on this process in order to principally restrain the 
analysis. That is, to determine first whether there is a foreseeable 
derivative market for the original work in the defendant’s medium in 
light of the incentive rationale underlying copyright law as well as 
market impact considerations borrowed from the fair use analysis. 
A. Defining “Faithful Adaptation” 
Most courts and commentators accept that differences required by 
a change in medium should not matter when evaluating substantial 
similarity.180 The implication is that the differences due to the change 
in medium should be filtered out of the comparative process, much 
like scenes a faire and other unprotectable elements are filtered out.181 
Nonetheless, comparing the protectable elements of works in different 
media is still problematic, as the Idema case demonstrates.182 For 
example, when comparing a sculpture to a photograph,183 does one 
look at the elements for visual artwork (which might apply to a 
sculpture) or the elements for photography?184 Individual elements 
are also problematic. Photographic elements like angle of view, 
framing, shading, and lighting185 appear to be irrelevant for a three-
dimensional sculpture. Similarly, if the visual art work elements 
 
180  See supra notes 6, 136–41. 
181  See supra note 166. 
182  See supra notes 148–52 and accompanying text. 
183  Cf. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
184  See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
185  See L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); LaChapelle v. 
Fenty, 812 F. Supp. 2d 434, 445-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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apply, what does one make of the “materials” element186 when 
looking at a typical photograph? 
Rather than simply ignoring the precedential tests as irrelevant (as 
Idema might suggest), or attempting to force a “square peg into a 
round hole” comparison, courts should first translate the plaintiff’s 
work into the medium of the defendant’s work. The derivative work 
right protects the author’s right to transform an original work into a 
new medium in order to exploit a different market.187 Thus, where a 
plaintiff alleges that a work in a different medium infringes an 
original work, it is the plaintiff’s right to produce a derivative work in 
that second medium that is at issue. Where the derivative work right 
is infringed, the derivative is the relevant benchmark, not the original 
work. The process of transforming the original work into the second 
work’s medium will accomplish what the courts have said is the 
proper manner of proceeding: filtering out the differences necessitated 
by changing the medium. It will also maintain the utility of the 
existing test for various works. Courts will no longer be at a loss 
when attempting to compare works in different media that have 
different expressive elements due to the fact that they are in different 
media. 
The Rogers v. Koons case is illustrative.188  In that case, the 
plaintiff’s black-and-white “Puppies” photograph depicted a couple 
with eight German shepherd puppies that appeared in a newspaper 
and was later licensed for use in notecards and an anthology.189 The 
defendant subsequently prepared a polychrome (i.e., painted) wood 
sculpture, ultimately measuring forty-two inches by sixty-two inches 
by thirty-seven inches, that was otherwise intended to “be just like 
[the] photo.”190 The court correctly rejected the defendant’s initial 
argument that the change in medium precluded a finding of 
infringement.191 The court further rejected the defendant’s argument 
“that the differences in size, texture and color preclude[d]” a finding 
of substantial similarity.192 The court indicated that this second 
argument was “really the discredited ‘substitute medium’ argument in 
 
186  See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). 
187  See supra Part I.B. 
188  751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
189  Id. at 475. 
190  Id. at 476. 
191  Id. at 477–78. 
192  Id. at 478. 
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a different form.”193 It concluded that there was “no question” that an 
ordinary observer would recognize the sculpture as an appropriation 
of the photograph.194 It explained, “[q]uestions of size and color 
aside, the sculpture is as exact a copy of the photograph as [the 
defendant] could fashion.”195 Thus, the differences between the two 
works attributable to texture, material, and two- or three-dimensional 
nature were irrelevant because they were dictated by the choice of 
medium. Although color and size were not necessarily dictated by the 
medium, those differences were dwarfed by the striking and 
overwhelming similarity: the fact that the sculpture depicted the exact 
same image of a couple with puppies. Thus, in the Rogers case, the 
faithful adaptation would have been virtually identical to the 
defendant’s sculpture with the possible exception of color and size—
distinctions that paled in comparison to the striking similarities. 
The dispute over visual artist Shepard Fairey’s iconic poster of 
then-presidential candidate Barack Obama also provides another 
interesting example. Fairey had used an Associated Press 
photographer’s picture of Obama to create his poster.196 The image in 
Fairey’s two-dimensional poster was essentially the same as the 
photograph; however, Fairey had arguably turned it into “a stylized, 
blue pencil drawing . . . mimic[king] the propaganda posters of the 
mid-20th century.”197 The primary arguments in that case concerned 
the applicability of the fair use defense,198 likely because Fairey 
recognized that he would be unlikely to prevail on a lack of 
substantial similarity defense given that both works focused on an 
image of the president that was the same. Fairey’s other changes were 
arguably dwarfed by that striking similarity.199 
Of course, in many instances, translating a work from one medium 
to another is much easier said than done. As Professor Goldstein’s 
description of the process of adapting a novel into a film 
demonstrates, there may be many significant changes. Courts and 
 
193  Id. 
194  Id. 
195  Id. 
196  See Shelly Rosenfeld, A Photo Finish? Copyright and Shepard Fairey’s Use of a 
News Photo Image of the President, 36 VT. L. REV. 355, 355 (2011). 
197  Id. at 367. 
198  See id. at 355–56. 
199  Cf. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–11 (2d Cir. 2013) (determining that a visual 
artist’s use of numerous altered images from a photographer’s book was protected by the 
fair use defense for twenty-five of the thirty images at issue). 
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juries are unlikely to have the familiarity with the process necessary 
to perform the relevant analysis. Consequently, the process of 
translating the plaintiff’s work into the defendant’s medium appears 
to be one ripe for the assistance of expert analysis. In conducting such 
an analysis, experts should focus on translating the plaintiff’s work 
into the new medium using the expressive equivalents of the two 
media. Thus, in a case where a film has allegedly infringed a novel, 
experts could explain how professionals would go about faithfully 
adapting the novel into a film. They do this by identifying the 
“filmable elements” that would be utilized to create the faithful 
adaptation, and what film equivalents of those elements would be 
used to create the adaptation.200 With the “faithful adaptation” then in 
mind, one can easily compare both the individual elements and the 
“total concept and feel” of the plaintiff’s work as adapted into the new 
medium to the defendant’s work. Thus, in a case like Idema,201 an 
expert could explain how a studio would distill the plaintiffs’ story 
into “filmable elements,” substituting sets and acting for character 
development and scenic description.202 The court could then compare 
the hypothetical film resulting from this process to The Peacemaker 
to determine whether there was substantial similarity in plot, themes, 
dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events.203 
The faithful adaptation standard therefore accomplishes what the 
courts have said they are doing while preserving the relevance of the 
existing precedent in this context. It filters out the differences 
attributable to the change in medium while emphasizing the 
similarities that a lay observer might overlook. It accomplishes this 
latter task by translating the expressive elements of the plaintiff’s 
work into the new medium’s equivalents. By transforming the 
plaintiff’s “orange” into an “apple,” it thus allows the court to make 
an “apples-to-apples” comparison of the two works in the same 
medium using the accepted test for substantial similarity for that 
medium. 
 
200  See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
201  Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d, 90 F. 
App’x 496, 498 (9th Cir. 2003). 
202  See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 219. 
203 In most instances, the creation of an actual “faithful adaptation” would be cost 
prohibitive and is unnecessary since experts are capable of explaining how the process of 
doing so would unfold, leaving it to the court or jury to evaluate the resulting similarities 
and differences. 
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B. Remaining Problems 
Some, however, still suggest that differences attributable to a 
change in medium are significant and should matter when 
undertaking a comparison for substantial similarity.204 Although 
some of these commentators and courts may not have focused on the 
issue, there still may be a number of reasons why one might object to 
the faithful adaptation standard in a principled manner. 
One might object based on the controversial nature of the 
derivative work right. This raises the question: does the faithful 
adaptation standard further expand the derivative work right? If so, 
the standard is problematic for the reasons many scholars have 
identified when discussing why prior statutory expansions were 
arguably inappropriate or unnecessary.205 The point of the faithful 
adaptation standard, however, is not to apply the derivative right to a 
new category of works or expand the opportunities for infringement 
claims. The standard more clearly defines the circumstances under 
which a work in a second medium may infringe the original work. 
Indeed, the faithful adaptation standard is consistent with 
understandings of the derivative work right, such as Professor 
Abramowicz’s suggestion that infringement of that right occurs where 
the defendant’s work would compete with an “authorized 
transformation[] of the original,” but not the original itself.206 
Clarity in the law allows for predictability—a predicate for 
intelligent planning and economic expansion.207 Although applying 
the substantial similarity test in a manner that would account for 
differences attributable to a change in medium would arguably restrict 
the derivative work right—which critics208 of the derivative right 
might view as positive—it would do so at the expense of intellectual 
 
204  See Shipley & Hay, supra note 61, at 131 n.48 (suggesting that the relevant 
comparison is of “substantial similarity of copyrightable expression between the 
underlying work and the adaptation allegedly constituting a violation of the reproduction 
right, however, the adaptation will not be deemed derivative so as to infringe 17 U.S.C.  
§ 106(2) (1982)” (emphasis added)). 
205  See supra Part I.B.3. 
206  Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 386. 
207  Cf. Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of 
Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989) (offering 
reasons why “a high degree of consistency and predictability in the law is necessary to the 
successful operation of the legal system,” including because consistency and predictability 
allow for “intelligent planning and structuring of transactions”). 
208  See supra Part I.B.3. 
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consistency. Moreover, applying the substantial similarity test in this 
manner would create a disparity with the manner in which the 
derivative work right is applied where there is no change in medium. 
To the extent that the derivative work right does protect a translation 
into a new medium—and under the current statute it plainly does209—
the differences attributable to a change in medium should not 
preclude a finding of infringement. Attempting to accomplish a de 
facto narrowing of the right by erroneously interpreting the law is the 
type of subterfuge that should not be condoned. Even if one agrees 
with the goal, such interpretations create confusion in the law and 
engender uncertainty.210 
Beyond fundamental disagreements with the present statutory 
formulation of the derivative work right, there may be other reasons 
for resisting the faithful adaptation standard.  Indeed, a more difficult 
question is whether there are instances where no faithful adaptation of 
the plaintiff’s work in a new medium would exist. If so, this begs the 
follow-up question, how can the faithful adaptation standard address 
this concern? 
There may be some types of works that are incapable of being 
faithfully adapted from one particular medium to another. In other 
words, the media may be so different that one work’s protected 
expression may not have any equivalent in the other medium. Most 
would probably agree that computer code, for example, could not be 
faithfully adapted into a dramatic work and vice versa.211 As 
discussed above, however, derivative works are possible in many 
 
209  See supra notes 38–39, 60–61. 
210  Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (noting the 
importance of the law in shaping economic relationships when analyzing stare decisis); 
State ex rel. City of Charleston v. Bosely, 268 S.E.2d 590, 601 (W. Va. 1980) (Neely, C.J., 
dissenting) (“[I]n the area of economics certainty in the law is the pre-eminent policy of 
justice.”); ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 468, 503 (2007) (noting the 
importance of protecting intellectual property rights to economic prosperity and explaining 
that “[e]ffective property and individual rights in general decrease uncertainty and open a 
wider scope for risk taking and the actions that can produce material well-being”). 
211  Cf. Robert A. Kreiss, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1497, 
1543 (1991) (suggesting that in the context of 17 U.S.C. § 117, an “adaptation” of a 
computer program is a derivative computer program, and not a sound recording, movie, 
novel, or work in another medium); John Cady, Copyrighting Computer Programs: 
Distinguishing Expression from Ideas, 22 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 15, 19 (2003) 
(noting the difficulty of applying traditional literary tests “to factual works such as 
computer programs which normally do not have events and characters”). This is distinct 
from the works that one might create utilizing a computer program, which most would 
agree are not derivative works of the programs—e.g., a piece of music created using a 
program replicating a musical instrument is not a derivative of the program. 
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different contexts, including somewhat counterintuitive notions such 
as photographs infringing choreography,212 which at least implies that 
the choreography could also infringe still images. 
Music presents a particularly challenging example. Of course, 
derivatives of sound recordings may be made using parts of the 
original sound recording, most frequently in the form of remixes.213 
Once the medium changes beyond those traditionally associated with 
musical works, however, the analysis becomes more difficult. For 
example, a music video would plainly infringe a sound recording, if 
not authorized. But what if a video consisted of images depicting the 
substance of the song’s lyrics without using the sound recording or 
any sound whatsoever? 
Providing another example of this conundrum, the band Frightened 
Rabbit wrote a song that was inspired by a scene in a Ben Kingsley 
film.214 In the film, Kingsley’s character decides to commit suicide 
by swimming directly into the ocean with no apparent intention of 
turning back, before ultimately stopping at his friend’s urging, and 
subsequently being shown back on shore, drenched.215 In the song, 
titled “Swim Until You Can’t See Land,” the narrator describes a 
similar predicament while the lyrics and music evoke a mood 
arguably similar to the character’s despair in the film’s scene.216 But 
could the song constitute a faithful adaptation of the film? 
Most would likely say that the answer is “no.” There are, of course, 
many differences between the two works. Most of them, however, are 
dictated by the difference in media. If the film were faithfully adapted 
into a song, many of these differences would drop away. So why then 
would there not be infringement? 
Initially, there is still a question of whether there is a sufficient 
degree of protected expression in common. The idea of a character 
contemplating suicide is most certainly unprotectable.217 There would 
 
212  See Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1986). 
213  See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012); see, e.g., RAC, http://rac.fm (last visited Sept. 2, 
2014). 
214  See Frightened Rabbit: Inspired by Solitude, NPR (Mar. 12, 2010, 12:57 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=124619818. 
215  THE WACKNESS (Sony Pictures Classics 2008). 
216  FRIGHTENED RABBIT, Swim Until You Can’t See Land, on THE WINTER OF MIXED 
DRINKS (Fat Cat Records 2010). 
217  Cf. Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (indicating that depictions of a businessman contemplating suicide by leaping off of 
a tall building were not protectable). 
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also be a question about whether a taking from a single scene—albeit 
an arguably important one—in a ninety-nine minute film is 
“substantial.”218 But assuming there is substantial similarity of 
protected expression, the problem would remain. The answer must lie 
with the nature of the derivative work right itself. As noted above, the 
touchstone of the right is the existence of an independent market 
unique to the derivative.219 Professor Samuelson has persuasively 
argued that the right extends to the foreseeable and proximate markets 
for the three main statutory categories of derivative works and “close 
analogues,” including medium transformations.220 The question then 
becomes whether there is a foreseeable market for such a song that 
would have provided the film’s creators with an incentive to create 
the film in the first instance. As the answer to the question is certainly 
“no,” no faithful adaptation of the film in the music medium can 
exist.221 
In these instances, there must be a predicate question of whether an 
adaptation into the new medium is foreseeable. In other words, does it 
represent a market that the author might contemplate exploiting at 
some point during the creative process?222 To the extent that it does 
not, it is beyond the scope of the derivative right and is therefore 
unprotectable. Because the market is theoretical, there is no need for 
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the author did in fact contemplate 
exploiting a particular derivative market.223 The plaintiff only needs 
to show that the he or she could have reasonably foreseen such a 
market during the creative process.224 In this respect, new 
technologies (involving new markets) are somewhat problematic. 
However, as Professor Balganesh suggests, the key to whether such a 
future market is foreseeable depends on whether the new technology 
 
218  See supra Part I.C.2. 
219  See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
220  Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1559. 
221  Other cases might present a tougher issue. For example, where a film’s theme song 
is expected to have a significant market based on the content of the film itself an author 
could theoretically invade or even usurp that market with a competing song. This might be 
the case for film franchises featuring distinctive music (such as the James Bond franchise) 
or films featuring musical content. Compare, e.g., SKYFALL (Columbia Pictures 2012), 
with ADELE, Skyfall, on SKYFALL (XL Recordings 2012), and 8 MILE (Universal Pictures 
2002), with EMINEM, 8 Mile, on 8 MILE (Interscope Records 2002). 
222  Balganesh, supra note 7, at 1574–75. 
223  Id. at 1605 (“It is not relevant whether the plaintiff actually foresaw the defendant’s 
form of copying; it only matters that the copying was foreseeable, in light of the 
information available to him at that stage of creation.”). 
224  Id. 
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“has the effect of replacing the demand for creative work in existent 
markets” (i.e., results from demand diversion), or primarily creates 
new demand.225 The former market is foreseeable; the latter is not. To 
the extent that no foreseeable derivative market exists, however, then 
no faithful adaptation would exist, and—although the differences 
attributable to the fact that the works are in different media remain 
irrelevant—the similarities must be evaluated compared strictly in 
their original media. 
The fair use defense may provide additional support for finding no 
substantial similarity where there is no foreseeable market for the 
second medium.226 Under a fair use analysis, where a work has been 
transformed in such a way that it will not usurp a potential market that 
the author might have foreseen, then no infringement has occurred.227 
When assessing the market impact of an allegedly infringing use 
under the fair use test’s fourth factor, courts focus on whether the 
challenged use would have an adverse affect on the potential market 
for the plaintiff’s work if it became widespread.228 That is, if the 
defendant’s conduct were “unrestricted and widespread,” would it 
“result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for or 
value of the plaintiff’s present work?”229 The plaintiff, however, must 
have an interest in the potential market; accordingly, the market 
impact factor has focused on “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed markets.”230 Notably, the market impact factor has been 
referred to as the “single most important element of fair use.”231 
Applying this analysis to the Frightened Rabbit song, the song might 
also qualify as a “fair use.” Although the purpose of the use does not 
appear to have been for criticism or other explicitly protected means, 
there was a transformative use, the amount of the taking was 
relatively small, and it very plainly did not supplant any foreseeable 
market.232 
Beyond fundamental issues adapting works in certain media to 
others, Professor Goldstein’s description of adapting a novel into a 
 
225  Id. at 1608. 
226  See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
227  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
228  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985). 
229  NIMMER, supra note 102, § 13.05[A][5], at 13-183 to 13-184. 
230  Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (quoting Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930–31). 
231  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
232  Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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film suggests that there may be instances where an adaptation would 
not retain any expression from the original work.233 In such an 
instance, the derivative work right would not protect the resulting 
adaptation because a derivative work must not only bear some degree 
of originality but also borrow some of the original work’s 
expression.234 In instances where no expression is retained, such an 
adaptation is not a derivative work and consequently, cannot 
constitute a faithful adaptation for the purposes of copyright law. 
C. The Faithful Adaptation Standard 
The refined faithful adaptation standard thus has two components: 
(1) assessing the foreseeability of the market for the adaptation of the 
work in the new medium; and (2) faithfully translating the work into 
the new medium using equivalent means of expression. The first 
inquiry asks whether the plaintiff would reasonably contemplate 
exploiting the market for the work in the new medium at some point 
during the creative process. A necessary corollary of this inquiry is 
whether the author could have foreseen such a derivative market that 
theoretically could have been profitably exploited. The second inquiry 
then asks how a professional in the relevant field would go about 
faithfully adapting the work into the second medium by translating 
the work’s expressive elements into the new medium’s equivalents, 
borrowing expression from the original work while adding some 
degree of originality as dictated by the new medium. 
These inquiries are necessarily case and fact specific. The first 
aspect of the test prevents the second (primary) inquiry from 
overreaching beyond the intended confines of the derivative work 
right. The second then seeks to protect those aspects of the author’s 
expression that can be faithfully translated into the new medium. In 
doing so, it evaluates the similarity of expression without considering 
the changes dictated by the differences in medium. 
Expert analysis may be useful in evaluating both aspects of the test. 
Expert analysis thus could be used to explain: (a) whether the work 
could be adapted to the new medium (i.e., is there a market that can 
be profitably exploited?); and (b) how a professional would adapt the 
work into the new medium. This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that expert testimony would be required. As the discussion above 
demonstrates, there may be situations where there is no reasonable 
 
233  Goldstein, supra note 2, at 219–20. 
234  See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
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possibility that an author would have contemplated exploiting a given 
derivative market. In such cases, a court could rule as a matter of law 
that no substantial similarity exists. 
Similarly, if it is readily apparent that the two works are not 
substantially similar even disregarding differences dictated by a 
change in medium, then the court may rule for the defendant as a 
matter of law based on the plaintiff’s inability to satisfy the second 
aspect of the test, without any expert analysis. Indeed, many courts 
have recognized that there is no categorical rule precluding them from 
evaluating substantial similarity as a matter of law, even at the 
pleading stage.235 Perhaps demonstrating the continuing relevance of 
the old maxim that “everyone is a critic,”236 courts have seemed 
particularly comfortable evaluating substantial similarity as a matter 
of law in the case of literary works.237 Courts will likely also be 
comfortable evaluating claims where the change in medium is 
relatively modest. For example, determining whether a film infringes 
 
235  Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64–65 (2d Cir. 
2010); Nelson v. PRN Prods., Inc., 873 F.2d 1141, 1143–44 (8th Cir. 1989); Christianson 
v. W. Publ’g Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945) (“There is ample authority for holding 
that when the copyrighted work and the alleged infringement are both before the court, 
capable of examination and comparison, non-infringement can be determined on a motion 
to dismiss.”); Zella v. E.W. Scripps Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2007); see 
also NIMMER, supra note 102, § 13.03[E][3] at 13-116 n.264.68 (concluding that although 
“the procedural posture applicable here is usually summary judgment for the defense . . . at 
times the court may simply dismiss the complaint”). 
236  E.g., Frank Rich, Roaring at the Screen, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2011), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE0DC1E3BF933A05753C1A9679D
8B63 (“[A]mbitious professional arts criticism is an increasingly arcane calling in a digital 
world where the old maxim, everyone’s a critic, is literally true.”). 
237  See, e.g., Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (noting that the court has “frequently” affirmed summary judgment in favor of 
defendants and stating that it is “often” appropriate to determine substantial similarity “as 
a matter of law”). On occasion, courts have seemingly gone out of their way to opine on 
the artistic merit (or lack thereof) of the works they were evaluating. E.g., Situation Mgmt. 
Sys., Inc. v. ASP. Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he district court’s 
originality analysis was obviously tainted by its own subjective assessment of the works’ 
creative worth.  Its assessment of originality displayed nothing but pejorative disdain for 
the value of [the plaintiff’s] works.”). Judges, of course, are human and when evaluating a 
far-fetched infringement claim by a little-known plaintiff against a well-respected 
defendant with a broad body of work, it may be difficult to resist the temptation to note the 
rather obvious fact that the parties are not competing in the same league. The danger here 
is that the courts may let their own subjective impressions of a work’s artistic merit color 
their legal analysis of an infringement claim. Cf. Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United 
Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (recognizing that 
copyright protection applies regardless of a “lack of artistic merit”). A full discussion of 
this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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a screenplay may not require any expert analysis.238 Generally, 
however, the courts will likely find that expert analysis provides 
significant assistance when evaluating infringement claims involving 
a change in medium. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the derivative work right is controversial, it does not 
appear to be going anywhere any time soon. As long as it does exist, 
its contours should be clearly defined. In light of the existence of the 
right, courts and commentators have generally recognized that 
changes dictated by a difference in medium should not preclude a 
finding of substantial similarity. As this analysis demonstrates, it 
follows that an author’s expression should be protected in a second 
medium to the extent that the second medium represents a market that 
the author would reasonably contemplate exploiting and the work 
may be translated into the second medium using expressive 
equivalents to facilitate a substantial similarity analysis. The faithful 
adaptation standard protects this interest without expanding the 
derivative right beyond its statutory underpinnings, in accordance 
with the Copyright Act’s mandate “to promote the advancement of 
knowledge and learning by giving authors economic incentives . . . to 
labor on creative, knowledge-enriching works”239 without unduly 
limiting the rights of “others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by a work.”240 
 
 
238  E.g., Funky Films, 462 F.3d at 1074–76 (affirming grant of summary judgment on 
the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants’ television series infringed their screenplay). 
239  CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 
1994) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8). 
240  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991). 
